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A significant amount of recent scholarship and commentary accuses China of plundering the African continent, coddling its dictators and flouting labor and environmental standards. This Article makes the counterintuitive claim that, despite irrefutable cases of abuse, China's engagement with Africa has actually improved the human rights conditions of millions of Africans. First, it places China's abuses in context, showing that they differ little from the abuses and patronage politics of the major Western powers. Second, it examines the evolution of international relations between China and various African countries, from the exportation of political revolution in the 1950s and 1960s, to the promotion of human capital in the 2000s and 2010s. Third, it catalogs the many recent contributions in the educational, agricultural, infrastructural and medical fields that China has made to African development. By challenging the dominant narratives on both theoretical and empirical grounds, I call for a reexamination of a critically important, but often misunderstood, pattern of interactions between China and Africa, a nexus that is shaping world affairs and perceptions in unprecedented ways.
INTRODUCTION
China's recent engagement with Africa has elicited copious commentary from the West, much of it negative. International media, 1 think tanks, 2 NGOs, 3 bloggers, 4 academics, 5 government officials (elected and appointed), 6 international financial institutions 7 and accusing Beijing of colonialism. 12 The PRC actively supported anticolonial movements in many African countries during the 1960s and 1970s. 13 Instead, such criticisms overlook both the historical dimension of Sino-African relations and the current emphases of the SinoAfrican nexus. China's developmental assistance, military support and terms of engagement hark back to the 1950s, but address Africa's contemporary concerns and needs in ways that the West has largely overlooked.
The larger point, however, is that we simplify Sino-African relations at our own risk. If we think China is simply draining Africa of natural resources while buttressing its dictators, we ignore most of China's activity in Africa, including direly needed contributions towards Africa's economic development. At the same time that Western countries and financial institutions dial back aid to Africa, China is actually increasing its financial, agricultural and technical assistance. 14 12. It is problematic for Western powers to accuse China of "colonialism," given American, Belgian, French, British, Italian, German, Portuguese, Spanish and Dutch colonialisms from the mid-seventeenth century to the late twentieth century. China, by contrast, has not colonized any part of Africa. Unlike former colonial powers, China actually pays for the resources it extracts, through infrastructure projects, cash, preferential loans or other forms of payment. Indeed, it is tempting to make the counterfactual argument that had the colonial powers actually invested in developing Africa's infrastructure during their centuries of colonization, China would have a much smaller presence in Africa right now.
13. For example, China armed groups in Namibia, Zaire (the present D.R.C) and Rwanda during the 1960s, and set up a guerilla training camp in Burundi 20 China's support for despotic regimes must surely enter into the discussion of its human rights footprint. But a more nuanced assessment of China's presence in Africa must also include the hundreds of infrastructure projects, agricultural experiments, educational facilities, pilot projects and other components of Beijing's Africa policy. 21 Many on this list have also been characterized as "strong men," not exactly steadfast supporters of democratic institutions such as free and fair elections or independent courts. But they did assume the reins of power through democratic elections.
21. China is, of course, a disaggregated entity, and thus the "Chinese presence" in Africa actually refers to representatives of national ministries (Commerce, Foreign Affairs, engagement with Africa, generates insights into China's "developmental diplomacy," and elucidates the human rights implications of China's foreign policy. This Article attempts to move beyond mutual recrimination by introducing Chinese perspectives into the discussion of Sino-African affairs.
The goal is not to justify China's presence in Africa-not that such justification is necessary-but to reorient the discussion by using terminology and historical understandings familiar to China, and the Global South more generally. It is misguided to assume all foreign countries approach Africa in the same way. Former colonial powers like France, Britain, Italy and Portugal relate to African countries in ways that reflect their unique histories. For example, on the eve of the Arab Spring, France offered to dispatch security forces to prop up then-troubled Tunisian dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, 22 revealing a paternalism deeply embedded in the former colonial relationship between the two countries. French airstrikes in Mali, conducted in response to a request from Malian President Traore, likewise indicated that the colonial past is less distant than perhaps once thought. 23 Moreover, Italy hesitated to join the NATO bombing of Libya, ostensibly because of its colonial ties, 24 more specifically to protect both countries' bilateral investments. 25 Education, Health, Agriculture), national banks (Exim bank), provincial-level infrastructure companies, private entrepreneurs, laborers and a host of others. Unfortunately, the dominant discourse still speaks of "China's presence in Africa." By and large, similarly expansive language is not used to describe U.S. interactions with Africa. China has no former colonies in Africa, but its current approach to fifty African countries reflects historical interactions, as well as its own developmental needs. Injecting Chinese and Southern perspectives into the debate leavens the discussion, destabilizes Western assumptions about Africa and highlights the ways that China is exporting-and could do more to export 26 -its own developmental model to compete with Western ones. The emphasis on infrastructure, creation of special economic zones, interest-free loans and other features characterize China's own economic rise. At a time of heightened fiscal tightness in the developed world, 27 China keeps pouring investment, people and equipment into Africa. Perhaps it is time to see if China can teach the West about working with Africa. At the very least, we need to grapple seriously with the proposition that China provides a meaningful, and increasingly popular, alternative to western sources of aid, expertise and developmental assistance.
This Article proceeds in four parts. To grasp the human rights implications of China's engagement with Africa, we must first understand how China views human rights. Though a dynamic concept that has modulated slightly over the past two decades, China's human rights platform has maintained a basic consistency over time. 29 Two key concepts include emphasizing collective rights over individual ones, and privileging social and economic rights over civil and political ones.
First, China emphasizes collective rights over individual ones. This runs counter to core Western assumptions about human rights, and the liberal democratic framework of international human rights law (IHRL) more generally. 30 International human rights law, as created after World War II, endows the individual with rights that he may then deploy against national governments. This endowment stems from the natural rights idea that humans enjoy certain entitlements simply by virtue of being people. 31 In other words, IHRL serves to check governmental authority over the individual, ideally ensuring a sphere of personal autonomy into which the state may not 28 intrude. 32 But the individual does not lie at the heart of Chinese society, either presently or in traditional China. Like other Asian countries, China stresses communitarian values, the importance of groups within society and the state's interests over those of the individual. From a rights perspective, China would prefer to buttress the rights of the entire community, rather than permit an individual to assert rights against the state or community. 33 This tendency is surely changing as greater individual autonomy bubbles up in contemporary China, with important ramifications for asserting human rights. 34 But the official Chinese view privileges the group at the expense of the individual, with important implications for foreign policy and the disbursal of foreign aid. Whereas Western donors may elect to fund a project to promote democracy, entrench human rights, support civil society or enhance governance, 35 China would prefer to furnish the basic subsistence needs of large groups of people. 36 Both Western and Chinese sets of projects legitimately advance human rights, but the divergent goals and methods of attaining those rights leads to confusion and recrimination between China and the West.
Second, as a developing country run by a putatively communist state, the Chinese government and the majority of Chinese scholars prioritize social and economic rights over civil and political ones. 37 39 Civil and political rights, on the other hand, refer to the rights to vote, run for office, assemble, free speech, practice a religion of one's own choosing, receive a fair trial and so on. In the Chinese conception, and in the Marxist tradition more generally, socioeconomic rights are the foundational human rights upon which civil and political rights become possible. 40 Consequently, in the Chinese conception, so long as China is still constructing its socioeconomic foundation, discussion of civil and political rights is premature. Scholars point out that these two sets of rights are not mutually exclusive; prioritizing one set over another is a Cold War anachronism arising out of ideological differences between Western and Soviet states. 41 That is true as an empirical matter, yet nations-including the United States-continue to prioritize one set at the expense of the other. 42 and 300 million people out of poverty in a generation. See, e.g., Anup Shah, Poverty Facts and Stats, GLOBAL ISSUES (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.globalissues.org/article/26/povertyfacts-and-stats (discussing World Bank Development Indicators for China). In the United States, by contrast, the poverty rate has hovered between 12 and 13% during this period, states, stress social and economic over civil and political rights. 43 More broadly, the South has promoted the "right to development," a core of indivisible rights needed to assure the basic necessities of life. The 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development charges states with ensuring that their people enjoy "access to basic resources, education, health services, food, housing, employment and the fair distribution of income." 44 Scholars focus on three rights in particular-to food, to primary education and to health-as the bedrock upon which all other rights depend. 45 Once a person has acquired an education and achieved a level of health, the state can concern itself with providing employment, income, shelter and other basic resources.
Fundamental though the right to development may seem, its status as international law is far from assured. Developed countries have long sought to neutralize or deny the existence of the right. The United States voted against passing the Declaration in the UN General Assembly, while many other Western states abstained. 46 Nevertheless, the Declaration enjoys wide support among the developing world, even as it lacks the broad international backing needed to crystallize as a binding legal obligation.
One key disagreement involves against whom the right may be claimed. The Declaration tasks states with providing for nationals within their jurisdiction, as well as "the duty to co-operate with each other in ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to developwhile the absolute number has increased from twenty-eight to thirty-six million people. See, e.g., National Poverty Center, Poverty in the United States: Frequently Asked Questions, U. MICH., http://www.npc.umich.edu/poverty/#3 (last visited Apr. 12, 2013). In other words, the United States has made little progress ensuring the socioeconomic rights of its populace, while China has made progress the likes of which the world has never seen. On the other hand, China has done little to safeguard the civil and political rights of its citizens, who do not have free and open elections, the right to practice religion freely, the right to assemble freely and so on.
43 Where are developed countries to turn? One response would be to each other. It is surely significant that the only international instrument enshrining the right to development is the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, making the right applicable against African states. 49 And when those states are incapable of providing the core elements of the right to development, presumably other inclined states should step in to provide assistance. China, then, can play a critical role in ensuring the right to development is guaranteed in the Global South.
Western states' disinclination to enshrine the right to development is not simply a matter of international law; it also shapes the international financial institutions they oversee. As Anne Orford has argued, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund-the heart of the Washington Consensus-have long implemented policies that actively thwart the right to development. Since 1986, the World Bank has attached conditions to structural adjustment loans to require the privatization of basic industries, and the liberalization of trade and investment. 50 Other structural adjustment loans force governments to cut spending on health and education, lower the minimum wage, produce goods for export (instead of satisfying domestic needs) and deregulate the labor market. 51 These prescriptions arguably succeeded in certain developed countries, such as the United States and United Kingdom, during the heyday of Reaganism and Thatcherism.
But the neoliberal paradigm has not facilitated growth in 53 And of course, the 2008 financial crisis has punctured many myths about the desirability of unregulated economic activity, and leaving the "invisible hand" to correct errors and bottlenecks in the market. In addition, China's own rise has led many to reconsider the conventional wisdom traditionally ascribed to neoliberal economics and deregulation. The state has played the central role in China's economic rise, overseeing dramatic economic growth without precedent in human history. 54 The Chinese example provides an alternative narrative to how states and societies develop in the contemporary period. Little wonder, then, that African leaders increasingly turn their attention towards China in reevaluating the proper balance of state intervention and private initiatives.
II. CHINESE VIEWS OF FOREIGN POLICY
To understand China's current engagement with Africa, we must also absorb the key features of China's foreign policy. For half a century, China's diplomacy has abided by the "Five Principles," a platform first agreed upon by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1954. 55 1. equality and mutual benefit in providing aid; 2. no conditions for any privileges; 3. imposing the lightest possible burden on recipients; 4. help the country gradually achieve self-reliance; 5. aid projects require little investment but quick results; 6. provide best-quality equipment of its own manufacture; 7. ensure the recipient country masters new techniques; 8. Chinese experts cannot enjoy special amenities. 57 Principles two (non-conditionality) and five (quick results after small investment) are particularly important to the present discussion. Before examining these principles, however, it is important to note their consistency over the past several decades. Since its founding sixty-plus years ago, China's domestic situation has undergone wild vicissitudes. From the Great Leap Forward (1959-61), where tens of millions starved to death, to the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), which terrorized generations of Chinese, to the reform period's pursuit of a semi-market economy (1978-present), the PRC has endured some of the most extreme and violent ideological, political, economic and cultural swings of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, the basic parameters of its foreign policy have remained intact for most of the PRC's history. 58 61 Of course, other policy shifts can be seen by reviewing past administrations' approaches to foreign affairs.
To be sure, espousing principles and enacting them differ, sometimes vastly. China has maintained a rhetorical stance that its actions have not always mirrored. Take mutual non-interference. China firmly believes that it should not, and will not, engage in activities that infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations. In return, it does not permit other countries to interfere in its own internal affairs. But throughout the 1960s and 1970s, China supported a wide array of guerrilla movements in Africa. China actively supported guerrillas, providing financial and materiel support to rebel groups in Zaire (present-day D.R.C.), Malawi, Zimbabwe, Angola, Rwanda and Burundi. 62 It would be silly to assert that such activities did not "interfere" in the internal affairs of these states. China tried to justify its conduct by claiming to support anticolonial movements, and thus to help African countries win their independence from various European states. Still, it is undeniable that, during its early history, the PRC actively meddled in the internal affairs of African states.
More recently, China has scaled back the revolutionary rhetoric, but it continues its arms sales. The concern with inciting communist revolt has been eclipsed by finding new markets to export its manufactures obtaining natural resources, and testing new technolo- I will return to these countries later in the discussion, 67 but here simply note that China's support for unsavory African leaders cannot be divorced from its broader network of relationships in Africa. Every African state that recognizes and maintains diplomatic relations with China (and not Taiwan) receives some kind of aid. 68 Thus, unlike France and Britain, which channel the vast majority of their aid and assistance programs almost exclusively on former colonies, China works with everybody. 69 And while many criticize China's collaboration with "the worst of the worst," the United States also provides assistance to such countries as Angola, Sudan But with Zheng's death in Calcutta on the seventh voyage, the era of Chinese maritime expedition ground suddenly to a halt. Speculation abounds as to why China-having set forth the largest overseas expedition in human history-abandoned this endeavor. Perhaps China had met its goals of extending its influence to distant lands, proving its military capabilities, expanding Chinese knowledge of the world and incorporating more states into its tribute system. 72 Or perhaps threats closer to home occupied the Ming Dynasty's attention. 73 Whatever the explanation, China turned its back on Africa for the succeeding five centuries.
China's neglect contrasts sharply with the more active involvement of early Europeans. The Portuguese conquered their first African city in 1415 (Ceuta), captured their first slaves in 1441 (Cabo Branco, Mauritani) and established Europe's first slave-trading company in 1444 (Lagos, Nigeria). 74 The consequences of European exploitation, enslavement and extraction are well known at this point, and do not require additional explication. Yet these historical origins matter for contemporary relations between China and Africa on the one hand, and the West and Africa on the other.
After the founding of the PRC in 1949, China maintained more regular contact with Africa. Between 1956 and 1977-amidst the internal chaos of the Great Leap Forward (1957) and Cultural Revolution (1966-76)-the PRC provided an estimated $2.668 billion in economic assistance to African countries, approximately fiftyseven percent of its total foreign aid. 75 China supported not only its ideological brethren experimenting with socialism, but states of all political stripes: monarchies, dictatorships and democracies. China provided aid to thirty-six African nations during this period, a broad swath of the continent.
At this time, the largest recipients of Chinese aid were Tanzania and Zambia, most of which was spent constructing a 2000-km railway discussed below. Other large recipients included Egypt, the first African state to recognize the PRC, Somalia and Zaire, all of which received over $100 million during these two decades. 76 While not large by global standards, these sums are nonetheless impressive in light of the fact that China was itself a developing country, unable to feed its own population for several of these years. 77 foundations for many of its current relationships in the 1960s, providing small amounts of military and financial aid to newly independent states and guerrilla movements.
Chinese aid frequently took the form of small loans, spread out over a period of up to ten years, to dozens of African countries. 78 China gave more foreign aid to Africa than Eastern European countries; indeed China outspent even the Soviet Union in many subSaharan states, 79 maximizing its influence by providing aid to a large number of newly independent states, whatever their political ideology. A handful of former colonies shared China's revolutionary fervor, and this revolutionary suffused a number of political pronouncements from this early period. 80 But China was no ideological purist, providing aid to countries of vastly disparate political inclinations. During its first decades, the PRC spent the bulk of its foreign aid in Africa, more or less ceding Latin America, the Middle East and South Asia to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 81 In the immediate post-revolutionary period, China's primary political purpose in Africa was securing diplomatic recognition. A young country born into the world with an ideologically opposed twin brother on the island of Taiwan, China needed allies in a world eager to contain it. The United States firmly opposed Chinese involvement in various international organizations, including the United Nations. 82 The isolation was exacerbated by the Sino-Soviet riff in the early 1960s, leaving China more vulnerable to international pressure. Since it was not a member of the United Nations until 1971, and not recognized by most countries during the 1950s and 1960s, China courted African countries to secure recognition of its international status. In April 1955, Premier Zhou Enlai and Vice Premier Chen Yi attended the Summit on Afro-Asian Solidarity in Bandung, Indonesia, holding talks with leaders from various North and Sub-Saharan African States: Egypt, Sudan, Libya, Liberia and Ethiopia. 83 One year later, Egypt became the first country to enter during the Great Leap Forward).
78. CIA Report, supra note 75, From technical and public relations perspectives, the greatest achievement of China's Africa policy was the Tanzam Railway, stretching 1,156 miles from landlocked Zambia to coastal Tanzania. At a cost of just under half a billion dollars, China supplied much of the labor, and an interest-free loan payable over thirty years, to the governments of Tanzania and Zambia. At the time, the World Bank, the United States and the United Kingdom had denied requests to fund the project. 91 So, too, did the United Nations, the U.S.S.R. and Canada. 92 British colony and an Arab island, had few allies among the more powerful states. China stepped in to fill the void, generating goodwill among two newly liberated African states, while also gaining access to Zambia's rich copper belt. This is part of the "mutual benefit" or win-win results that China has long touted as central to its foreign policy.
Despite the impressive scale of the Tanzam railway, most of China's aid to Africa was spent on less grandiose projects. 93 China spent the remaining two-plus billion dollars on smaller projects with more localized influence. According to the CIA, China "had become the African countries' favorite donor in the early 1970s," by funding a wide assortment of infrastructure projects. 94 Projects included, but were not limited to, (1) building a nuclear power plant and deepwater port in the Mauritanian capital of Nouakchott, and supporting medical and agricultural projects in the country; 95 (2) constructing a hydroelectric dam in Congo, and building related electrical capacity; 96 (3) resurfacing a road in Madagascar; 97 (4) building a hospital, sports stadium, flour mill and ceramics plant in Rwanda. 98 In July, 1966, two months into the chaos of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, China laid the foundation stone of the Friendship Textile Mill in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, the largest fully-integrated textile mill in East Africa at the time. 99 The mill presently operates through a Sino-Tanzanian joint venture company, employing over one thousand Tanzanians. 100 Further afield-and China has made a point of sending experts, aid and equipment into the more remote regions of AfricaChina built dams, factories, a pharmaceutical plant in Tanzania and other basic infrastructure to help provide basic subsistence for one of 102 China made similar inroads throughout Guinea, building a hydroelectric plant in Pita, a dam in Tinkisso, a refinery in Madionoula, in addition to railway construction and repair. 103 China also assisted in agricultural development of an unspecified nature. While this section has emphasized various types of subsistence projects, it is also important to recognize the breadth of Chinese military support. For certain states, this support amounted to direct meddling in internal affairs, again presenting a challenge to China's long-held self-conception as a state that does not interfere in other nations' business. Apart from the generation of goodwill, the Tanzam railroad and larger emphasis on critical infrastructure to politically isolated states presaged key aspects of China's Africa policy: providing basic necessities on relatively generous financial terms to countries when no other institution or government will offer assistance. This preference has continued relevance in the present day. Many contemporary commentators censure China's support for rogue states, 104 overlooking the fact that China occupied a similarly degraded position for decades.
Since the late 1990s, China has redoubled its activities in Africa across a wide spectrum of sectors. Many efforts have been reported in the Western media: arming the Sudanese military, 105 vetoing UN Security Resolutions against Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, 106 shooting miners in Zambia, 107 or supporting kleptocra-cies in Angola. 108 But China's presence in Africa extends far beyond the conflict-ridden regions of Zimbabwe and Sudan, and the resource-rich areas of Zambia and Angola.
In 2000, China initiated the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), a multifaceted intergovernmental mechanism to promote development and strengthen ties between China and those African states that recognize the PRC. Since that time, triennial ministerial meetings in Beijing and various African capitals (Addis Ababa, Cairo), coupled with annual and biannual meetings between lower level officials, has enhanced Sino-African trade, investment and mutual comprehension. 109 Bilateral trade between China and Africa has grown eighty-fold in over a decade, from two billion dollars in 1999, to $160 billion in 2012. 110 Chinese foreign direct investment into Africa, though notoriously difficult to track, also appears to have skyrocketed. Between 1996 and 2007, the amount of FDI also increased eighty-fold, from fifty-six million dollars to $4.46 billion. 111 While these are not vast sums-either in terms of China's total outward investment, or Africa's inward investment-they do suggest the large increases in economic activity between China and Africa in the recent past.
Sino-African relations have evolved over the past six decades. Early ties between the continent and China grew out of China's linked desires to win diplomatic recognition from members of the international community, and to support nascent anti-colonial movements. Small independent states, while not significant political actors on the global stage, cast votes at the UN General Assembly, and echoes a 2005 incident, when an explosion at the Chinese-owned and -operated Chambishi mine killed forty-eight Zambian miners.
108. China was able to wrest the UN seat from Taiwan in 1971 in no small part due to close connections with dozens of African countries. China's relationships with African states of various stripes hark back to this era. And of course China itself struggled to win international recognition among the international community. Its current support for "rogue" states-a term understood best from the eye of the beholder-stems from connections first cultivated decades ago.
IV. SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS IN AFRICA
The remainder of this Article examines the human rights implications of China's presence in Africa. Given the above articulation of China's human rights concerns, the focus will be on programs to entrench socioeconomic rights of African people. In the past several decades, China has implemented hundreds of projects in nearly every African country: building hydropower plants and railroads, training medical personnel and students, paving roads, building ports and so on. In so doing, China has helped raise the living standards, and entrench the socioeconomic rights, of millions of Africans.
Before turning to these forms of assistance, it is important to note that China would probably not use the language of entrenching human rights to describe its presence in Africa. In surveying Chinese scholarship on Sino-African relations, the issue of human rights rarely comes up. When it does, it often responds to abuses chronicled by Western journalists, scholars and academics. 112 This is in part because "human rights" is still a sensitive term in Chinese diplomacy, given the decades of accusations leveled against China for its own human rights abuses. Prolonged censure has led China to tread carefully on this issue, particularly in the international arena. Generally speaking, China hesitates to call attention to other countries' human rights abuses, unless of course that country has already criticized China's own record. 113 112. See, e.g., JIN CANRONG, BIG POWER'S RESPONSIBILITY: CHINA'S PERSPECTIVE 115-121 (RENMIN UNIVERSITY PRESS 2010). Professor Jin notes various criticisms from the West, but counters them by noting China's foreign aid, economic cooperation, trade, capacity-building endeavors, infrastructure projects and so on. Notably, he avoids the term "human rights" in this analysis.
113. China is largely reluctant to criticize other countries' domestic situations. But China has responded to the United States Department of State's annual summary of other countries' human rights records by publishing the "U.S. Human Rights Record" every year since 2000. See, e.g., State Council Information Office, U.S. Human Rights Record in 1999, http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/ppflg/t36620.htm.
During its own three decades of reform and opening up, China-like many other East Asian countries before it-has prioritized economic development over other forms of human development. More concretely, China has privileged feeding, housing, clothing, educating and providing for the basic subsistence of its citizenry, over environmental concerns, workplace safety, food safety and so on. On the one hand, this has led to one of the greatest economic success stories in world history, and the epochal lifting of hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. 114 On the other, China has also achieved more dubious accolades, such as surpassing the United States as the world's leading producer of carbon dioxide, 115 leading the world in deaths attributable to mining accidents 116 and executing more prisoners "than the rest of the world combined." 117 China's conduct in Africa reflects the prioritization of socioeconomic rights over other types of human development. By targeting trade, investment, infrastructure, education and agriculture, China is trying to replicate in Africa various aspects of its own domestic economic transformation. At the same time, the lax environmental and labor standards by which Chinese companies operate in Africa unfortunately replicate the lax environmental and labor standards practiced at home. In other words, the African implementation of the China model may raise living standards for some, while simultaneously depressing the quality of life for others.
China's conduct in Africa differs from the West in other ways as well. Unlike Western aid projects-whether from G-8 countries or international financial institutions (IFI)-China does not attach strings, or "conditionalities," to its development packages, whether in the form of improved governance indicators, better economic management, a particular ideology, improved human rights record or otherwise. The refusal to incorporate conditions, frequently criticized in the West, is not exactly a new paradigm for China. Julius Nyerere, Tanzania's first democratically elected president, described China's financial support for the Tanzanian-Zambian railroad in 1974 in the following way: "The Chinese people have not asked us to be- come communists in order to qualify for this loan . . . . They have never at any point suggested that we should change any of our policies-internal or external." 118 Indeed, Nyerere would later single out conditionality as one of the primary evils inflicted by IFIs on developing countries. 119 Decades later, China's ideological agnosticism appeals to many African states, not just those countries that have fallen afoul of Western standards of good governance and human rights, but also those that simply do not want to be preached to. The last point suffuses Chinese scholarship on this issue, namely that China's relationship with Africa is "win-win," that China is Africa's "all-weather friend" and that its assistance represents South-South cooperation. China ostensibly sidesteps the paternalism of Western financial institutions and donor countries by approaching Africa as a classmate (one hesitates to use the word "equal" given China's enormous economic clout vis-à-vis individual African countries), instead of a taskmaster. While IFIs have dictated the rules of engagement, often without significant input from African stakeholders, China has not unilaterally promulgated one formula to cure Africa's myriad developmental ailments.
China's economic engagement with Africa is a complex topic on which entire books have been written. 120 Four points are especially salient to the discussion of human rights: the emphasis on infrastructure, medical services, education, and food and water. Western aid programs have either overlooked these areas, 121 121. For example, the World Bank insisted throughout the 1980s and 1990s that African users pay for health and education services, despite the obvious fact that many Africans could not afford them. This led to a decline in access to health services in many countries, recent past. 122 Yet each facet is essential to the continued development of Africa, and the realization of basic socio-economic human rights.
A. Infrastructure
There is no human right to infrastructure per se. But international human rights law guarantees a number of rights that hinge directly on functional infrastructure and the benefits that flow from the ability to move goods, people and resources around a country. Some 60 years ago, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognized "the right to a standard of living adequate for . . . health and wellbeing . . . including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services." 123 The International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (which China has ratified) recognizes "the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living," to include food, clothing, housing and "the continuous improvement of living conditions." 124 Likewise, the 1986 Declaration of the Right to Development stresses the "constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population" and the "fair distribution of the benefits resulting therefrom," to be achieved through international cooperation. 125 To be sure, no covenant mentions power plants, highways, railways and the like. Yet it would be difficult to deliver medical and social services, or to attain the fair distribution of benefits, without a fairly large network of roads, trains and airports.
China has helped build and repair roads, trains, ports, fiberoptic cables and other channels to aid the flow of information, goods and people all across Africa. China has invested in the building of schools, hospitals, offices, health-care centers, malaria prevention centers and other facilities to improve the health and developmental capacity of Africans. In 2007, China provided over 3 billion dollars to construct ten hydropower plants in Nigeria, Sudan and other places. 126 In 2007, China also launched a satellite for the Nigerian govwith concomitant ill effects on health (e.g., rises in infant mortality rates), and significant erosions in government spending on education. ernment, which will boost broadcasting, phone and internet capabilities throughout the continent. 127 A significant portion of China's assistance aims to provide basic infrastructure and other public goods: roads, railways, power plants and so on. Such assistance materially improves the lives of ordinary Africans by accelerating the delivery of food, clothing, medicines and other necessary products to remote corners of the continent. At the same time, it eases the flow of goods and natural resources produced in Africa to markets in the continent and around the world. By one estimate, China has engaged in 519 projects in Africa, laying down some 3,000 kilometers of road and 2,000 kilometers of railroads. 128 The construction of roads may seem distant from the human rights agenda, but it can in fact be considered a pressing human rights concern. Basic infrastructure is critical to human development, and Africa sorely lacks such roads. 129 South Sudan, Africa's newest country occupying a territory roughly equivalent to that of France, contains fewer than 100 kilometers of roads. 130 Many African countries face similar deprivation. In an amusing, if dispiriting, report by The Economist, a 370-mile journey from Douala, Cameroon to the interior city of Bertoua took the correspondent four days, instead of the twenty hours originally planned. 131 In light of the infrastructural challenges facing Africa, Chinese investment plays an increasingly vital role. 132 One notable state-owned enterprise is the China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC), which has been active in twenty African countries since the 1960s. 133 While aggregate statistics are not available, individual sources reveal the scope of CRBC's footprint in Africa. In Kenya, CRBC has constructed over 1,000 kilometers of roads since 1985. 134 Its most famous project in East Africa is a section of road that links Nairobi, Kenya's political and economic capital, to Mombasa, its main port. Known locally as the "China Road," it receives plaudits from Kenyan drivers as the "best road in Kenya and even in East Africa." 135 The CRBC has also built the Addis Ababa Ring Road in Ethiopia. Other Chinese companies include the China Railway Seventh Group, active in half a dozen African nations, including its least developed. 136 It has built, or plans to build, substantial roads in Tanzania, Ethiopia, Zambia and Botswana. 137 Chinese citizens in fifty medical teams serve in forty African nations, including surgeons, internalists, gynecologists, anesthesiologists and practitioners of traditional Chinese medicine. 147 Chinese doctors practice not only in major cities like Algiers and Dakar, but also in some of the most underserved areas of Africa. 148 While many Western doctors stay close to the wealthier or more comfortable urban areas, Chinese doctors serve the poorest regions in Africa, such as Lumina, Democratic Republic of Congo, 149 Labe, Guinea, 150 or Jinja, Uganda. 151 Indeed, many Chinese teams provide the only medical treatment available in many parts of the continent. 152 In addition to sending medical personnel, China has also spent considerable sums to build permanent physical structures in Africa. China has built or helped build thirty hospitals in various African countries, 153 including the Central African Republic, GuineaBissau and Chad. 154 Such facilities further expand local people's access to medicine, an issue that continues to plague millions of Africans. China has also built thirty malaria prevention centers, and pledged 500 million renminbi (roughly eighty million dollars) of anti-malarial drugs and equipment to various African countries. 155 Support for malaria is especially valuable, as it kills one million African children every year, and infects hundreds of millions of Africans. 156 China also sends teams to educate African medical workers on the prevention and diagnosis of malaria. 157 
C. Education
Education has been a central plank of the human rights platform for the entirety of the postwar period. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, though not binding, proclaimed that elementary education should be free and compulsory, and higher education should be "equally accessible to all on the basis of merit." 158 Later, the ICESCR recognized "the right of everyone to education," and bound states parties to provide free and compulsory primary education, "generally available" secondary education and higher education that is equally accessible to all. 159 Despite these guarantees, it is unclear how many Africans actually enjoy this right. A lack of qualified teachers, classrooms and learning materials has conspired to make primary school enrollment in African countries "among the lowest in world." 160 One of the keys to China's own rise, particularly in the past decade, has been its investment in education. In Africa, too, China stresses the importance of education and training in its assistance programs. Across the continent, China has built over 100 schools, and established twenty-nine Confucius Institutes in twenty-two countries. 161 The latter propagate Chinese culture, but also provide instruction in Mandarin, fast becoming the world's second lingua franca after English. Chinese and African universities have also entered into cooperative agreements to facilitate the exchange of ideas and research. China has paid special attention to higher education, providing an eighty million dollar loan on favorable repayment terms, and a significant amount of labor and materials, to Malawi to build a University of Science and Technology. 162 China has also contributed to the human development of African people. In its half-century of bilateral relations, China has trained some 40,000 Africans across various sectors, and provided scholarships to 20,000 Africans to study in the PRC. 163 The number of scholarships has increased gradually in the past several years, from 2,000 in 2006, to 5,500 in 2012. 164 China has recently reduced the number of undergraduate scholarships available to African students, and raised the number for master and doctoral studies. 165 These funds help ensure an important sector of the African elite understands, and perhaps feels some gratitude towards, China. That is, such initiatives capture both minds and hearts.
D. Food and Water
As noted above, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the ICESCR both guarantee the right to an adequate standard of living, and specifically provide for the right to food. 166 The right to water has a far more recent provenance, recognized only in 2010, 167 even as water is obviously vital to the creation, sustenance and propagation of life itself. Despite their status as fundamental human rights, however, food and water elude millions of Africans; obtaining sufficient quantities of both has long proven an intractable problem. This condition is frequently exacerbated by drought, war, corruption and the difficulties of coordinating responses by the international community. mali, Chad and Niger. 168 Agricultural production offers one significant way to lower the likelihood of the next famine, while boosting the health and longevity of this generation of Africans.
To meet some of these demands, China has built twenty agricultural demonstration centers throughout Africa, and regularly dispatches agronomists to advise on raising agricultural productivity. 169 In Senegal, for example, Chinese agronomists have introduced rice cultivation techniques, and new strains of rice through a pilot program with the Senegalese Ministry of Agriculture. 170 According to Chinese sources, three pilots set up along the Senegal River tested two strains of rice and various cultivation techniques, which yielded between two to three times the quantity of rice as local varieties and techniques. 171 The Chinese then train local farmers in the new cultivation techniques, and will probably sell them seeds, perhaps at a discounted price. China's presence could very well double or triple rice productions for Senegalese, but China will eventually be paid for its efforts. But it is also important to note that this will ultimately be a commercial enterprise. China is not doing charity work in Africa; this is no mission civilisatrice. Rather, China hopes to develop new markets for products it is developing; these demonstration stations allow local scientists, farmers and officials to taste, and test, the wares before deciding to purchase.
Access to clean drinking water likewise plagues many on the continent. With the Sahara Desert covering nearly one-quarter of its land, Africa is among the driest continents. Periodic droughtsEthiopia in the 1980s, Niger and Mali in the 2000s-have exacerbated this aridity, and led to the starvation and deaths of millions of Africans. Even in sub-Saharan Africa, clean water remains a scarce natural resource.
Since the first team was sent to Tanzania in 1965, Chinese engineers have drilled some 4,000 water-wells in twenty African countries. 172 Not every well leads inexorably to a stable water supply, yet many African villagers can thank China for relatively secure access to water. In the early 1970s, for instance, Mauritania requested Chinese assistance in building wells. The Chinese built eighteen wells, as well as a fifty-six kilometer piping system, to bring water to the 800,000 inhabitants of Nouakchott. 173 Later in the 1970s, after signing a bilateral agreement with Nigeria, China sent twenty-seven engineers to dig dozens of wells in the northwest part of the country, near the basin of Lake Chad. 174 Even now, Nigeria continues to welcome Chinese engineers, who have built 220 hand-drawn wells, and seven electric wells, since 2005. 175 Under a 2004 bilateral agreement, China will build 598 wells in Nigeria, for 180 local governments spread out across all eighteen provinces, as well as in its four administrative capitals. 176 Even in Darfur, where temperatures regularly exceed 100-degrees, Chinese peacekeepers have drilled a well to provide water for members of the joint African Union/United Nations peacekeeping mission. 177 Finding water in such an environment is, of course, both a humanitarian and human rights concern.
E. Response to Professor James Thuo Gathii
During President Nixon's 1971 visit to China, Nixon asked Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai about the impact of the 1789 French Revolution. "Too early to tell," Zhou reputedly answered, outlining a historical horizon far longer than most Westerners would probably accept. 178 Professor Gathii, in his response to my article, makes a similar assessment about the human rights impact of China's pres-ence in Africa. 179 It is simply too soon to conclude whether China is actually advancing the cause of human rights in Africa. While I appreciate his penetrating critique, and concur with much of what he writes, I would like to offer three clarifications in response.
First, Professor Gathii expresses concern about the "longterm sustainability" of China's contributions to human rights in Africa, suggesting that my analysis focuses solely on short-term improvements. But as I showed in Parts III and IV, China has worked on African infrastructure projects for over four decades. The Tanzam railroad suggests that projects can be at once monumental, revolutionary in their day and still functional some thirty-five years later. True, the longevity of current projects is unknowable at the present moment. But I would argue that the responsibility for the long-term effects of a road, power plant, well, school or other structure cannot be pinned solely on the Chinese side. Africans too must accept responsibility for ensuring the continued operability of these tools. While China must train African personnel on the use and maintenance of these various projects, the onus for the long-term sustainability of these projects ultimately falls on Africa, not China. Again, comparison with China's recent history is helpful. China has moved very quickly up the value chain in its manufactures over the past three decades, not because Western companies voluntarily handed over valuable technology and trade secrets, but because China's laws and regulations required transfer technology. African countries should follow suit.
Second, Professor Gathii writes that I deploy an "extremely low baseline to establish the effect of China's presence in Africa." 180 I do not disagree. Indeed, the discursive space in which I write pays virtually no attention to the benefits of China's presence in Africa. By describing some of these benefits, and placing them within a wider human rights framework, I seek to challenge widely accepted verities that China is a colonizer and drain on Africa's natural resources. In pushing the needle ever so slightly, I hope that future treatments of the Sino-African issues can avoid the self-serving dualism that China is a reckless exploiter, and the West offers Africa its best hope of development. The baseline is low primarily because I am writing in a discursive vacuum.
Third, Professor Gathii rightly points out that China's interstate relations are statist, ignoring or overlooking civil society groups 179. See Gathii, supra note 26, at 666. 180. Id. at 667. and other non-state actors. 181 Since, as Gathii states, Africa's leadership does not often act with the interests of most Africans in mind, there is the distinct possibility that Chinese support will benefit elites, but not the overwhelming majority of Africans. I share this concern, and have elsewhere written about the important work that Chinese lawyers, activists and other civil society actors do in challenging Chinese authorities on human rights matters. 182 Yet it is undeniable that civil society remains weak and fragmented in China. The little influence it wields is unlikely to be felt on distant shores; authoritarian states such as China discourage challenges on their own soil, and are unlikely to cede their monopoly on power in the foreign context. In sum, Africans will need to ensure that China's developmental assistance is well deployed by selecting leaders to represent their interests. Yet since few African states are fully democratic, this is an unlikely prospect. 183 
CONCLUSION
China's engagement with fifty African countries extends far beyond aiding and abetting the least savory regimes. In the 1950s, China first gained a foothold in the continent through small aid projects in thirty-six countries. In the past ten years, China has played an increasingly visible role throughout the continent, across a wide range of fields, from building schools and malaria centers to constructing roads and hydroelectric power plants. While China does not use the banner of human rights to trumpet its rice experimentation centers, medical teams or water wells, these projects have helped raise the living standards, and secure the fundamental human rights, of millions of Africans. Just as China's unique, state-centric model of development has brought hundreds of millions of its own citizens out of poverty, its projects in Africa promise to do the same for Africans. To be sure, China's support for a small number of "rogue states" has thwarted international sanctions, and Western plans to isolate these regimes. While unfortunate, such support is largely unrepresentative of China's Africa footprint, which covers a much
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CHINA'S HUMAN RIGHTS FOOTPRINT IN AFRICA 663 broader area than these conflict-ridden regimes. Perhaps it is now time to consider whether China's models, activities and counterexamples can teach the West something that our own decades of developmental experience, following centuries of colonialism, have failed to illuminate.
